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The Impact of NGOs on South Korea’s Decision  





This study focuses on how South Korea’s internal societal pressures affected the decision making 
process on the agenda of troop dispatch to Iraq and how it affected the alliance relationship with the 
United States. Ever since South Korea has matured into a democratized, civil society, there are now 
numerous voices on almost every issue, including the US-ROK alliance, which had previously been 
immune from any heated public debate. Since the early days of the previous administration, however, 
Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have emerged as a powerful player even in the realm of 
foreign and security policy decision-making which had remained hidden from the public eye. It is 
important to pay particular attention to the activities by the Citizen’s Action against Deployment to 
Iraq, a coalition group of 351 NGOs established for the specific goal of  influencing the government. 
This coalition group employed at least 17 different strategies to mobilize public support for their cause. 
This study ends with the conclusion that the Blue House which was wary of losing the progressives’ 
votes in the then-upcoming elections, missed a window of golden opportunity by refusing to cooperate 
with the U.S. forces in Iraq. It could have increased Roh Moo-hyun government’s bargaining power, 
reformulated the missions of the Korean forces and enhanced its capabilities. It is unfortunate that the 
US-South Korean alliance has not experienced any notable improvement despite Seoul’s dispatch of an 
additional 3,000-men troop to Iraq. The US-ROK alliance relationship could further deteriorate 
because now NGO leaders aim to make the transfer of US bases to Osan-Pyongtaek area impossible. It 
is high time for policymakers of the two countries and others who are concerned to maintain a high 
watch over the NGO’s strategies and their way of using governmental subsidies to prevent further 
damage to the alliance. 
 







On October 18, 2003, South Korea’s Roh Moo-hyun government decided to send 
additional troops to Iraq upon the request of the United States (US) government. The U.S. 
had wanted the Korean (ROK) troops to be deployed to Mosul to replace its 101
st
 Airborne 
Division. Nevertheless, there was clearly a huge gap between the U.S. and South Korea on 
what should be the role and the purpose of the Korean troops, and in the end, the final 
destination was changed from Mosul to Kirkuk and then again to Irbil, a Kurdish region in 
northern Iraq.  
South Korea made it clear that the bill authorizing the deployment does not allow the troop 
to work under the US Command or participate in joint combat operations. 
According to the bill, the Korean forces’ mission is limited to civil affairs and post-war 
reconstruction. This has been extremely frustrating to the Bush administration because the 
US military, eager to relieve itself of the heavy burden of its army division, was in desperate 
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want of South Korean contribution in its stabilization operations in the key areas of the oil-
rich northern state.    
The so-called “Troop dispatch diplomacy” had been Seoul’s most effective policy tool to 
gain confidence of the US from which Seoul could benefit from as was the case of the 
Vietnam war where Washington needed allies’ participation in its not-so-popular war efforts 
during the 1960s.
1
 Today, this no longer seems to be the case. While Seoul is faced with 
strong pressures from NGOs, the new elites in power do not hesitate to denounce the US war 
efforts in Iraq.  
This study focuses on how internal societal pressures influenced the decision making 
process of troop dispatch to Iraq and how it, in turn, affected the alliance relationship with 
the United States. Ever since South Korea has matured into a more democratized and 
pluralistic civic society, there are numerous voices on almost every issue including the US-
ROK alliance which had previously been immune from any heated debate in public. Since 
the early days of the Kim Dae-jung administration, however, NGOs have newly emerged as 
a powerful player even in the area of foreign and security policy decision-making. This study 
begins by explaining how the Roh Moo-hyun government walked the fine line between the 
external and societal pressures in handling the US request to send additional troops to Iraq. 
In the process of doing so, it is important to look into the NGO’s strategies, resources that 
they have available and the mind-set of their leaders. This study is then an attempt to open 
the ‘black box’ of the Korean decision making process. The second part is a brief overview 
of different positions of the ROK and the US concerning the size, the nature of the mission, 
and the timing of the troop dispatch and shows how these differences each affected the future 
of alliance relationship. Finally, this study concludes with a discussion of why we need to 
pay attention to such highly politicized NGO coalition and its activities.   
 
 
2. EXTERNAL PRESSURE VS. SOCIETAL PRESSURE 
 
Around July or August 2003, a rumor spread around Korea that the ROK forces might 
soon be sent to Iraq to assist the American forces already there (JoongAng Daily 9/9/2003).
2
 
This was nothing new since the US had requested the sending of ROK forces whenever the 
demand arose. According to a Korean source, the US had inquired more than ten times 
whether the ROK can assist the US stabilization efforts in Afghanistan during April and May 
of 2002 (Chosun Ilbo 5/28/2002). On May 27, 2002, General Tommy Franks, the 
Commander of US Central Command, manifested a clear interest in having a Korean combat 
battalion in Afghanistan (Chosun Ilbo 5/28/2002). In addition to combat forces, the US had 
shown interest in augmenting the ROK’s capabilities in Afghanistan including “mine 
breaker” vehicles, mechanic companies and medical units. The US military had also floated 
the idea of sending the ROK Special Forces group to the Philippines in early 2002 when they 
initiated a new kind of counter-terrorism operation (Chosun Ilbo 5/28/2002).  
The US officials were extremely cautious when they made such a request because they 
were aware of the strong anti-American sentiment that was at large within South Korea. The 
South Korean military officials were equally cautious and often turn it down. The Korean 
                                                          
1 See Unequal Partners: ROK-US Alliance during the Vietnam War. 
2 Korean government for the first time confirmed that the U.S. through unofficial channels requested 
that South Korea cooperate by dispatching additional troops to Iraq on September 8, 2003. 





military complied with the earlier US requests by sending a 90-men Mobile Army Surgical 
Hospital Unit to Kyrgyzstan in 2001 and dispatching 670 military engineers and medical 
groups to Iraq in 2003. However, in both cases, the Korean military officials turned down the 
US request to send additional combat troops. The Korean military officials mainly put forth 
the argument that approaching the problem through official diplomatic channels would 
provide the US with better chances. They explained that it is very difficult for the Korean 
military to obtain the National Assembly’s approval regarding the dispatch of troops.  
In the case of Iraq however, President Bush himself was in the forefront to recruit Korean 
combat forces. On September 3, 2003, he invited the newly-appointed Foreign Minister 
Yoon Young-kwan to the White House to garner the Korean government’s support in its 
stabilization efforts (JoongAng Daily 9/15/2003).
3
 Minister Yoon gave a reply that hinted at 
a positive outcome by saying that his government would study the US request. Presidential 
Advisor for National Defense LTG. Kim Hee-sang (Retired) also expressed his opinion that 
South Korea must soon accept the request.  
However, a huge gap existed not only between the US and Korean government officials 
but there was confusion and clash among the Korean officials in terms of the size, the make 
up, and the timing of the troop dispatch. Dispatching troops to Iraq was a thorny issue for the 
young Roh Moo-hyun government since his largest supporting group saw such move as 
something in direct opposition to their belief in the principles of self-reliant defense and anti-
war.  
President Roh was put in an awkward position since he had to deal with two directly 
opposing forces of one, the external pressure from the US, and the other, the societal 
pressure that strongly opposed assisting the US war efforts in Iraq. There was no easy way 
out. The best he could do was to delay making the final decision as long as he could afford to. 
This was fully understandable since as a first year president he could not risk his yet-to-be 
ripe political life to satisfy an external, foreign power. His political platform was still largely 
based on the progressive group and younger generation open to more reforms who 
emphasized self-reliant defense policies. From their own perspective, the US-South Korea 
relations needed to become one that is on a more equal footing.  
However, President Roh could not totally ignore the US request since South Korea was 
still heavily dependent upon the US in protecting itself from the potential threat of North 
Korea. His new role as the Korean President put him in a position where he could not but 
pore over the US position. In the end, President Roh opted to send troops but that of a much 
smaller size than what the US originally requested and at a much later moment than the US 
might have wished for.  
This new Korean behavior can be interpreted in two ways. Some in the Korean policy 
circle regard this as a well-coordinated, diplomatic victory based on the fact that the 
additional 3,000-men troop Korea sent to assist the US is still larger than any other US allies’ 
contribution excepting Great Britain. They believe that this is a historic turning point which 
showed the world that the ROK does not always acquiesce to US’s orders.     
However, it is not always easy to carefully balance the two positions. For those who 
criticize the soundness of this line of policy, the delay of the decision cost the President a 
golden opportunity to regain confidence of both the Bush administration and the American 
military establishment. Particularly, according to critics, South Korea’s decision to refuse to 
work together with the US in its stabilization efforts in the Kirkuk area was a big mistake. 
                                                          
3 Mr. Bush invited Mr. Yoon to the White House for a 20-minute meeting on September 3. 
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They believe that while this non-compliance with the American wishes would save 60 to 70 
Korean soldiers’ lives the decision would also hurt the mutual trust between the two 
militaries that took over fifty years to be built.  
The new power elite downplays the role of the US military as the foremost influential 
institution in US politics and foreign policy. American soldiers have fought with the Koreans 
side by side in the Korean and Vietnam wars and those actual combat experiences proved 
that Korean forces can be valuable in the grand scheme of American military strategy. 
Korea’s combat capabilities and its availability as an allied force have been regarded as an 
irreplaceable asset.        
The case of the US request for sending additional troops to Iraq has shown that President 
Roh was strongly swayed by the new power elite group that seeks to pursue an independent 
foreign policy and an alliance of equals at all cost. 
However, the new power elite’s emphasis on self-reliance and campaign of “putting the 
history back on the right track” is based on a system of subjective judgments and beliefs. For 
them, joining the Vietnam War was part of the shameful history of the authoritarian and anti-
democratic government of late President Park Chung-hee. According to their interpretation 
of the history, President Park bandwagoned onto the Johnson administration’s imperialistic 
and unjust war efforts in order to solidify its own political position. They believe that Rhee 
Syngman and Park Chung-hee used anti-communism as a tool for receiving the continued 
support from the conservative sector of the American society. With American assistance, 
they were able to prolong the lives of their authoritarian regimes by destroying the 
democratic principles and torturing those who stood to fight for democracy. Park Chung-hee, 
according to this line of history, justified participation in the Vietnam War as a way to pay 
the debt to the Americans the Koreans had borne from the Korean War. He succeeded in 
manipulating the public and forcefully injected a sense of gratitude into the whole society 
and consequentially, Korean youths were sent to fight in a foreign war as mere mercenaries 
and were sacrificed for no good reason.
4
   
The revisionist view is currently shared by most of the 386 Generationers and this strongly 
affects the core decision-making group within the Korean government, the ruling party, the 
media, members of NGOs and advocacy groups.
5
 President Roh finds it extremely difficult 
to turn his back on these supporting groups and so he has no choice but to wholeheartedly 
support their cause. Although President Roh has managed to maneuver his way out of the US 
request to send a larger number of combat troops, the hard-core radical members of NGOs 
and progressive politicians remain critical about his decision to dispatch 3,000-men troop to 
Iraq. Some members of the Democratic Labor Party organized a hunger strike to protest 
against President Roh’s decision and many labor unions and the coalition of 351 civic groups 





                                                          
4 For more detailed description of the roots of the leftist movement in Korea, see Hahm (2005: 61). 
5 So-called “386 Generation” stands for those progressive members who are in their 30s, attended 
college during the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s. They have become the new power elite in 
Korean politics and have begun introducing new ideas and policies that were once considered too 
leftist and hence taboo. 






3. NGO STRATEGIES, RESOURCES, AND THEIR IMPACT 
 
“Citizen’s Action against Deployment to Iraq (hereafter Citizen’s Action)” was established 
on September 23, 2003, as a scheme to systematically oppose the government’s decision to 
send troops to Iraq. They have made us of at least 17 different strategies to mobilize citizen’s 
support to their cause as is indicated in Table 1. 
 





Formal Informal Distributing Information Mobilizing the Crowd 
○1  ○2  ○3  ○4  ○5  ○6  ○7  ○8  ○9  ○10  ○11  ○12  ○13  ○14  ○15  ○16  ○17  
Frequency 2 1 2 5 6 1 33 22 5 2 21 4 25 12 5 7 5 
 
○1  Interview   ○9  Holding Conferences 
○2  Submitting Memoranda  ○10  Holding Exhibitions 
○3  Sending Questionnaires  ○11  Press Interviews 
○4  Protest Visit   ○12  Signature campaigns 
○5  Attending Conferences  ○13  Assembly and Demonstration 
○6  Lecture   ○14  Street Marches 
○7  On-line Dissemination  ○15  Sending Letters/Petitions 
○8  Issuing Statements  ○16  Taking Polls 
○17  Hunger Strike 
 
 
From September 23 to October 18, 2003, when President Roh finalized his decision to 
send troops, the NGOs increased the number of their activities and thereby successfully 
increased the pressure level felt by the President and his advisors. Although President Roh 
had basically decided to send troops in principle, he was hesitating on other issues and 
therefore was unable to decide on the details. It was National Security Council (NSC) Chief 
of Staffs Lee Jong-suk instead of President Roh who announced that the number of troops 
would not exceed 3,000. His announcement was regarded as a guideline and this remained 
unchanged. “Citizens Action” organized more than ten demonstrations in the streets during 
the period, distributed a leaflet among the people, and paid frequent visits to the members of 
the Committee of National Defense in the National Assembly. “Citizen’s Action” also 
developed a variety of pro-active measures to change the nature and the ways of US-ROK 
military cooperation. A little more  than 30% (48 out of 158) of their activities were carried 
out in the first month of their operations.  
As indicated in Figure 1, “Citizens Action” went about in three different channels to 
influence the decision. Mechanism I is their route to influence public opinion, while 
Mechanism II is the route to the highest office at the Blue House and the cabinet members 
through official channel of Special Advisor for the President for Political Affairs and Special 
Advisor for the President for Civil Participation. It was the first time that NGO leaders could 
meet officially with Presidential Advisors at the Blue House to discuss a national security 
issue. Mechanism III was a route to influence the National Assembly members and political 
parties. They checked voting records and monitored the activities of each Assembly member.  
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After extensive research of their activities, this study finds that public opinion is acutely 
divided and NGO activities did not successfully change those conservatives or realists who 
firmly believed that sending troops would best serve the national interest. NGO leaders tried 
to capitalize on the human right violations at the Abu Ghrib as grounds to mobilize further 
anti-dispatch movement. However, public opinion stabilized and became immobile once the 
United Nations (UN) adopted the resolution to assist Iraq. According to the poll conducted 
by Hankook Ilbo on October 23, 2003, 64.9% of the pollsters favored the idea of sending 
additional troops (HankkookIlbo 10/23/2003). It was a rather surprising result because 
respondents voted in favor of sending troops while they fully recognized that additional troop 
included combat soldiers. The approval rate was much higher than a previous poll where 
only 45.5% favored the sending of the troops to Iraq (Hankook Ilbo 10/23/2003). It was also 
interesting to note that the death of a Korean civilian in Baghdad did not do much to change 
the atmosphere in Korea. Actually, the tragic death of Kim Sun-il increased public support 
for sending troops. The public urged the government to not to yield to terrorists’ demands. In 
the end, Mechanism I proved only partially successful.  
With regard to Mechanism II, Presidential Secretaries have paid attention to the NGO’s 
appeals and have tried to explain their situation. The difficulties that the Blue House faced 
were well understood by the NGO leaders. They therefore never challenged the President to 
the extreme even though the President had not fully accept the NGO’s demand. It is 
interesting to note that the NGOs themselves were divided on whether or not they had to 
allow President Roh more flexibility. Some radical groups such as the Citizen’s Coalition for 





Democratic Media did criticize the ambiguity of President Roh’s position and his advisors, 
and called for an all-out attack on the US position.   
With respect to Mechanism III, NGO strategies were found to be very effective in 
influencing the individual members of National Assembly. Those members were worried 
that their vote to send troops to Iraq would render them losers in the coming April 2003 
elections. NGOs called on individual member’s office and organized protest in front of the 
Committee Chairman’s residence from time to time. NGOs sent their leaders to major TV 
talk shows and nightly news-type shows to promote their causes and disseminated their 
views through the Internet as well.
6
 Music concerts were organized to attract the younger 
generation who support the Roh Moo-hyun government. Even movie directors and rock stars 
were mobilized. Candle light vigils at Kwanghwamoon Street became their weekend routine 
to express the lay people’s discontent over the government decision.      
Their influence has had certain limitations. First, the NGO’s initial positions never 
changed regardless of the constantly-changing environment. Once the government 
announced that less than 3,000-men would be dispatched, people more or less began to 
accept it. They also began to worry that it might cause side effects by refusing to send a 
larger number of troops and delaying the decision all the while. After passing the point of 
October 27, when Lee Jong-suk capped the ceiling of the size of the troops, the NGOs’ 
influence receded. Since then, their demonstrations and many of the other options were used 
as a defense tactic of protecting those who oppose the US position in recruiting additional 
combat troops.  
The intensity and the frequency of demonstrations drastically declined once the Korean 
troops settled in Irbil. There were, of course, moments when public opinion erupted. When 
the US President Bush left out the name of the Korean President in expressing his 
appreciation for those leaders who helped to the US by sending troops to Iraq, the NGO 
coalition group did not respond by issuing a statement. NGO leaders wished that the rift 
between the ROK and US would result in an early return of soldiers back home. The US 
decision to prolong the end point of the withdrawal of the 2
nd
 Infantry Division forces by 
2008 at the 11
th
 Future of the Alliance) (FOTA) meeting and the visit of US Secretary 
Rumsfeld to the ROK headquarters in Irbil greatly ameliorated the situation in Seoul by 
quelling the critics.  
In summing up, NGOs have been influential in forcing the ROK government to delay the 
decision and reduce the size of the troops dispatched. Yet, their resources were limited; most 
of their budget had come from governmental subsidies as indicated in Table 2. And this is a 
critical weakness of the source of Korea’s democracy. It is highly unlikely that the NGOs 
would dare challenge the government if they are financially dependent on the government. 
To explain in detail how such system came into being, we need to go back in time. It was the 
previous President Kim Dae-jung who decided to actively subsidy the NGOs. The rationale 
behind such policy was that since private donations and funds were almost non-existent in 
Korean society there was no way but to assist those reform-minded NGOs if the Korean 
government wanted to to promote democracy. Unfortunately, his decision resulted in deeply 
politicizing the NGO movement as more radical progressives joined the mainstream political 
process through NGOs to support the then President’s ideas and policies that were once 
considered too leftist. The two most crucial ideas in this aspect were the anti-chaebol reforms 
                                                          
6 See www.antipabyung.jinbo.net. “Antipabyung” means against dispatch troops and “Jinbo” stands for 
progressive in Korean.   
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and the “sunshine policy” toward North Korea (Hahm 2005: 63). The NGOs managed to 
dominate the political agenda by initiating a national debate on removing the US bases in 
downtown Seoul and amending the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Some of their 
leaders used anti-Americanism as a tool for mobilizing support to their causes. And 
accordingly, the “Citizen’s Action” should not be regarded as an ordinary NGO coalition 
because its board members include famous opposition leaders such as Kwon Young-gil and 
Roh Hoe-chan of leftist Democratic Labor Party. They have been highly critical of the 
unequal aspects of the alliance partnership with the US. 
 
Table 2. Subsidy for NGOs by Each Department 
 
 
4. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL REVISITED 
 
Major players involved in the decision-making process have shown different positions 
with regard to the issue of dispatching additional troops to Iraq. First, the Ministry of 
National Defense (MND) and the Army were the most supportive governmental players to 
the idea of sending combat forces to Iraq from the very beginning. They also believed that it 
would be better to send a larger force should adequate funds be provided.    
Department Number of NGOs 
Budget for NGOs 
(Million Won) 
Ministry of Finance and Economy 109 1,880 
Ministry of Education & Human  
Resources Development 
1 30 
Ministry of Unification 1 450 
Ministry of Government  
Administration and Home Affairs 
182 15,000 
Ministry of Gender Equality 77 2,000 
National Human Rights Commission of 
Korea 
61 1,150 
Ministry of Culture & Tourism 3 700 
Ministry of Health and Welfare 36 8,520 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 8 2,530 
Ministry of National Defense 1 2,900 
Ministry of Environment 3 200 
Ministry of Labor 2 2,190 
Ministry Construction & Transportation 1 390 
The Ministry of Patriots and Veterans  
Affairs 
6 100 
Rural Development Administration 3 1,520 
Government Information Agency 32 830 
Korea Press Foundation 2 50 
Korean Broadcasting Commission 37 750 
Total 565 41,190 





Of course, opinions within the military varied as to the appropriate size of the forces. As 
Presidential Advisor for National Defense Kim Hee Sang suggested, many army leaders 
thought that small troops were not appropriate in dealing with the missions requested by the 
US (Dong-A Ilbo 9/14/2003). They understood that there was skepticism about such large-
scale dispatch within the government and were concerned about the public outcry which 
would ensue if larger troops were sent. The MND quickly finished its internal review in early 
September 26, 2003. MND suggested a compromised solution of dispatching elite troops 
consisting of 5,000 soldiers from the southern region of South Korea so as to not minimize 
the deterrence capability against North Korea (Dong-A Ilbo 9/26/2003).  
The MND did not disclose its position on the issue. General Kim identified three major 
reasons for supporting the sending of combat forces: first, South Korea would have more 
leverage when negotiating with the US on the issue of the realignment of American troops 
stationed in Korea. Second, it would also give Seoul an advantage in dealing with the issue 
of the North Korean nuclear standoff. Third, it could bring economic fringe benefits to Korea 
by enabling Korean private companies’ participation in reconstruction operations in post–
war Iraq. It might also guarantee a stable petroleum supply (Dong-A Ilbo 9/14/2003). Most 
Army high-ranking officers agreed with his observation and also, perhaps owing to past 
experiences of working together with the US, the Korean military members tended to view 
this kind of request as an opportunity.  
Second, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) wanted to save its face on 
the fragile state of the ROK-US alliance. Minister Yoon Young-kwan had been supportive of 
the idea of sending troops because this could possibly be the opportunity to restore the 
credibility and deal a decisive blow to the skeptics among the American public as well as 
opinion makers who questioned Korea’s role. Many high-ranking officials in the MOFAT 
worried that if Seoul declined the US request, more Americans would begin to discount 
Korea in the American security strategy in Northeast Asia. Key officials of the MOFAT 
maintained that the decision should be made no later than mid-October since President Roh 
was to deliver Korea’s position clearly to President Bush at the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) summit on October 20, 2003 in Bangkok, Thailand.  
Ministry officials also believed that Korea should not be left behind when more and more 
of the world’s nations were participating in the post-war operations. In addition, the 
unanimously-approved UN Security Council resolution to support a multinational effort to 
reconstruct Iraq on October 16, 2003, was viewed as a green light for the government to 
respond positively to the American request for additional troops.    
Third, the Blue House and the NSC did not share the optimism of these two previously-
discussed ministries. Their primary concern was the possibility of putting troops in 
dangerous situations and its potential negative impact on President Roh’s public ratings. For 
them, this was an important decision that required careful deliberation. In the end, they 
advised President Roh to remain a vague position and to repeat that he needed more time to 
make such an important decision.  
Ra Jong-yil, the National Security Advisor, hinted that sending combat troops was 
unthinkable in his interview with CBS Radio by saying that “because the war in Iraq is over, 
we are not thinking about sending troops that might be involved in violent conflicts” 
(JoongAng Daily 10/1/2003). Blue House Aides also wanted to minimize the size of the 
troops to be sent, taking into account significant public objections to the deployment. The 
Blue House became sensitive to the term “combat troops” after it became clear that 
Washington wanted troops similar to the Polish-led multinational, light infantry division.  
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Defense officials however were concerned that a multinational force would cause a 
serious communication problem. They preferred to have their own command, control system 
and independence of operation. Moreover, military officials strongly argued that dispatching 
a complete division of up to 10,000-men would provide more advantages for the security of 
the Korean forces. They also argued that versatile Special Forces Units would be particularly 
efficient in those operations because they had been trained in a variety of dangerous 
circumstances.  
The Blue House and the NSC, however, took a grave assessment of the Defense 
Ministry’s plan. Sending those elite forces would jeopardize the concept that South Korean 
troops were to be non-combat peacekeepers. What they feared the most was the possibility of 
rising domestic protest opposing the sending of additional combat troops to Iraq and the 
consequent loss of support from the young and the progressives. Moreover, sending an entire 
division would place too great a financial burden on Seoul, according to those officials.    
On October 18, 2003, soon after the NSC meeting, President Roh finally declared his 
decision to send troops to Iraq but again managed to maintain ambiguity by failing to show a 
clear schedule. According to Cho Young-kil, the Minister of National Defense, his 
government would present a more detailed plan after consulting the US Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld who was to visit Seoul for the ROK-US Security Consultative Meetings 
(SCM) on November 17, 2003 (Dong-A Ilbo 10/17/2003).  
Although they had decided to send troops to Iraq, discussion within the policy circle was 
drifting and they had a hard time in finalizing the details. All the while, President Roh 
worried that young voters would resent his decision and that would politically hurt him.  
In the third week of September, the “Citizen’s Action” organized mass public protests 
along with college students. The coalition consisted of 351 non-government organizations 
including the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). Politicians from both sides 
were wary of this kind of public protest because it would likely affect the upcoming election 
of 2004. 
Some key officials at the Blue House tried to create linkage between the issue of sending 
troops to Iraq with the softening of the Bush administration’s policies on North Korea 
(JoongAng Daily 11/18/2004).
7
 When they realized that this would not prove to be a 
precondition for sending troops, they finally decided to reduce the size of the troops. 
A senior official at the NSC said on October 27, 2003, that the size of the new South 
Korean deployment would not exceed 3,000 (JoongAng Daily 10/28/2004). However, Lee 
Jong-suk’s announcement to the press had not been consulted with the members of the MND 
and the MOFAT. One official from the MND complained that the minimum size of the 
troops needed to carry out an effective mission in Iraq could very well surpass 3,000 soldiers. 
Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan commented that the number should be tentatively taken 
as “an idea” among many (JoongAng Daily 10/30/2003). Defense Minister Cho Young-kil 
and the newly appointed Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Ban Ki-moon also said that it 
was too early to talk about the exact number of soldiers (JoongAng Daily 10/30/2003). 
However, the suggestion of a cap of 3,000 troops came after President Roh ordered his aides 
to refrain from making public comments on the deployment, a fact that some officials took as 
an indication that the number reflected the President’s position on the issue.          
                                                          
7 On September 26, 2003, Powell was infuriated when he met Yoon in New York. Yoon was trying to 
link the issue of sending troops with the Nuclear problem by saying that Seoul would not send troops 
to Iraq unless the US softens its stance against North Korea.  






5. RECONFIGURATION OR DISMANTLING: ALLIANCE IN QUESTION  
 
American senators Joseph Biden, Richard Lugar, and four others introduced a resolution 
to thank South Korea for its decision to send troops to contribute to American efforts to the 
stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq (JoongAng Daily 11/4/2003). However, the chasm 
was beginning to widen when the Korean delegation sat down together with their American 
counterpart in Washington, D.C. to discuss the further details of dispatching Korean troops 
to Iraq during November 5-6, 2003. 
In the negotiation, the US officials strongly expressed their interest in having at least 
5,000 –men, a “stabilization force” consisting of two regiments that might take charge of 
securing the public order in northern Iraq. According to the Reuters, the US had asked for 
one Korean combat division that could replace the US’s 101
st
 Airborne Division stationed in 
the Mosul area of northern Iraq.  
However, the Korean delegation hardly budged because the NSC not only capped the 
ceiling at 3,000 but also ruled out the possibility of any combat role. Soon after the meeting 
in Washington, D.C. the US announced the rotation of the 101
st
 Airborne Division by its own 
82
nd
 Airborne Division and thereafter, the possibility of Korean troop being dispatched to 
Mosul officially ended.  
President Roh Moo-hyun finally delivered his position to Secretary Rumsfeld when he 
visited Seoul for the annual SCM meeting on November 17, 2003. Secretary Rumsfeld, 
however, warned that the Korean troops would have to be responsible for their own safety 
and addressed the potential danger that lurked in Iraq (JoongAng Daily 11/19/2003).  
Key Korean officials within the Blue House believed that President Roh’s decision not to 
send more than 3,000 men against the wishes of the Bush administration was a step forward 
in its path to self–reliant foreign policy and equal partnership alliance that they had long 
cherished. They also believed that sending more than 3,000 soldiers, the third largest 
contingent among the allies, was enough to save face for President Bush.   
Once the decision was made, the Blue House exhausted all its efforts in persuade the 
members of the National Assembly to have the bill of deployment passed by the end of 
December. Five members of an advisory panel from the National Assembly who went to Iraq 
for a fact-finding mission, upon their return home suggested to President Roh Moo-hyun that 
future deployment should include both combat and non-combat forces and advised for an 
extra precautionary measure to prevent facing Iraqi hostility by distancing itself from 
Washington.  
Meanwhile, the National Security Advisor Ra Jong-yil hinted that Seoul needed more 
time to select, equip, and train the soldiers and therefore, suggested that he did not expect 
that the troop dispatch would be made before the National Assembly Election which was to 
be held on April 2004.   
Seoul finalized a decision to deploy a 3,000 military contingent of combat and non-
combat personnel to an unidentified region of Iraq on December 17, 2003. With “Seohee” 
(engineering unit) and “Jema,” (medical unit) that were already deployed in April 2003, the 
total number of the force would amount to 3,700. 
Strangely, the destination for Korean troops had not yet been decided. However, Korean 
forces wanted to send its contingents to Kirkuk among many other candidates, including Tal 
Afar, Karaya in northern Iraq, and Nasyriya in the south.  
 KYUDOK HONG 42 
 
With the troop dispatch consent bill passed in the National Assembly on February 13, in 
which 155 voted for and 50 against, 7 abstaining in a vote where 212 members were present 
out of 271, the Korean government officially established the Iraq Peace Rehabilitation 
Division on February 23, 2004. The so-called Zayituun Unit (Zayituun means “olive” in 
Arabic) began training for their non-combat roles (Dona-A Ilbo 2/13/2004). Meanwhile, the 
question remained of how to guarantee  safety of its forces from the terrorist attack without 
jointly working with the American forces stationed in the same area.  
Around March 2004, a rumor that with only a few weeks left before the dispatch, there 
was a discrepancy of opinion on the matter of a US military presence in the areas in Iraq 
where the Korean troops would be stationed began to circulate. The US government 
informed Seoul that due to the rising violence in the northern region of Kirkuk, some US 
military forces would remain in place even after the arrival of the Korean soldiers. American 
officials believed that the region was too crucial to leave in the hands of non-combatant 
Korean forces and suggested that South Korea work with American forces jointly in the area 
(JoongAng Daily 3/18/2004). 
South Korea and the US failed to agree on the specifics of the dispatch of Korean troops 
and the dispatch therefore had to be delayed once again. However, the Korean refusal to the 
US offer to leave the US forces in the region to assure the safety of the Korean soldiers had 
some negative spin-offs among the US military officials and made them question the utility 
of Korean forces as a key ally.  
It is understandable for South Korea to refuse to work together with the US since the bill 
approved by the National Assembly specifically stated that Korean troops would carry out 
reconstruction missions independently. However, it could also prove to be a fatal mistake to 
give up the opportunity of joint operations with the American forces. And joint operation in 
the area outside the Korean peninsula would give the ROK a strategic advantage to cultivate 
a new kind of mission in the future and also could provide a good opportunity to upgrade its 
military capabilities.     
However, South Korean reluctance to accept the US offer of joint stationing and joint 
operation in the Kirkuk area was solely based on the Ministry’s estimation that joint 
stationing would cause 30 to 70 casualties and it would an unbearable political setback for 
the Blue House. They believed that the Roh government could not survive through the angry 
reaction of the progressive and radical supporters if casualties were reported from Iraq. 
Avoiding casualties should be the first priority for those advisors if they indeed wanted to 
win the forthcoming National Assembly election.   
At a meeting in Baghdad on March 18, 2003, the United States finally accepted the 
Korean request to change the deployment destination (JoongAng Daily 3/19/2004). On 
March 19, Defense Minister Cho Young-kil reported to Prime Minister Goh Kun, the acting 
President that South Korea was considering two other destinations, the northern Kurdish 
provinces of Irbil and Sulaimaniya and the central-southern areas of Najaf and Qadisiyah.
8
 
He said that the government would make a decision within two weeks after further 
negotiations with the US (JoongAng Daily 3/19/2004). 
The United States asked South Korean troops to go to either Irbil and Sulaimaniyah, a 
Kurdish territory in northern Iraq, relatively safer than areas with large Arab populations. 
However, South Korea preferred to deploy the contingent in the central-southern provinces, 
                                                          
8 At the time, the National Assembly passed an Impeachment Bill and his right as the President were 
temporarily suspended and Goh Kun was playing his role as an acting President.  





from which the Spanish troops had withdrawn in late June. The Ministry of National Defense 
said that if Korean forces went to Najaf, the holy city of the Shia, the troop departure would 
take place in late June but if the contingent had to go to the northern region, departure would 
be a month earlier (JoongAng Daily 3/22/2004). 
Seoul needed to delay the dispatch since President Roh was under suspension of his right 
as the President due to the impeachment bill passed at the National Assembly and no one in 
the government wanted to facilitate the process while the President was waiting for the 
Constitutional court’s decision. 
In the meantime, the US announced that it would deploy its 2
nd
 Brigade of the 2
nd
 
Infantry Division stationed in Korea to Iraq. It stirred speculation that Washington made the 
move in part out of the irritation that Seoul had delayed a deployment of 3,000-strong 
additional troops to Iraq. It was a great shock to Koreans since many Korean officials had, 
with confidence, denied any possibility of the transfer of US forces in Korea to Iraq 
whenever the press tiptoed around the question. Even Korean Ambassador to the US Han 
Sung Joo said that “Secretary Rumsfeld does not mean that the US forces in Korea were 
needed in Iraq” (Dong A-Ilbo 11/16/2003). Once the US made a decision to transfer a 
brigade, the Korean government stepped up its efforts to deploy its troops. Despite a Korean 
citizen’s tragic death incurred by the terrorist group in Baghdad on June 21, 2004, the 
Korean government, with the support of the ruling Uri Party, sent the first troop in July 2004 
and the main contingent group in August to central Irbil and the nearby area of Ninawa in 
northern Iraq.  
 
 
6. CONCLUSION: MISSED OPPORTUNITY AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
President Roh said in his speech before the National Assembly, “I decided to dispatch 
troops, despite ongoing anti-war protests, because of the fate of our country and the people” 
(New York Times 4/3/2003). “In order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, 
it is important to maintain strong cooperation with the United States” (New York Times 
4/3/2003). President Roh was seeking to maximize Seoul’s influence on Washington in any 
moves the United States makes toward North Korea once the Iraq war has ended.  
Some give President Roh credit for his decision to push for troop deployment despite his 
own anti-war position and the strong public opposition to the war as part of a shrewd but 
risky bid to preserve the alliance with the United States.   
Unfortunately, however, the US-South Korean alliance has not shown any improvement 
despite Seoul’s dispatch of an additional 3,000 soldiers to Iraq. President Bush in his 
acceptance speech at the Republican Convention in New York, expressed his appreciation by 
mentioning eight countries and their respective leaders who courageously assisted the United 
States stabilization efforts. South Korea and President Roh were not mentioned at all. If this 
was a reflection of the mood within the Bush administration about the way Korea dealt with 
the issue of troop dispatch, Korea’s dispatch policy does not appear to be a successful one. 
Citizen’s Action against Deployment to Iraq, a coalition group of 351 NGOs, proclaimed 
that they would work to deter any attempt to prolong the stay of the Korean troops in Iraq. 
Korean troops had originally planned to stay in Iraq until December 2004 as stated in the bill 
passed in February 2004. Ironically, the “Citizen’s Action” did not challenge the Roh 
government’s decision to renew the duration of the Korean forces in Iraq for another year 
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despite its rhetoric which opposed precisely this. This was rather surprising considering the 
fact that a significant number of the Korean people still opposed the troop dispatch.  
At least two reasons can be assessed. First, it was a difficult challenge for the NGO 
leaders to push President Roh when the ROK troops in Irbil were not engaged in dangerous 
combat activities. They worried that too much pressure against President Roh might backfire 
and arouse angry reactions from the conservatives both at home and abroad. Second, a series 
of softened-US approaches including Secretary Rumsfeld’s visit to Korean forces’ 
Headquarters in Iraq, successful completion of FOTA meetings, and President Bush’s 
support on President Roh’s initiative on peaceful resolution of the nuclear standoff were 
regarded by the NGOs as a moral victory. Therefore, they did not intend to make an issue out 
of renewing the bill.  
The role played by the “Citizens Action against Deployment to Iraq” in the decision-
making process is unprecedented in the history of Korean foreign policy. As Korean society 
becomes more democratized and pluralized, security issues can easily become targets for 
heated debate, and the example of the US request of troop dispatch to Iraq clearly shows that 
South Korea’s progressive NGO leaders maintain their political upper hand. The problem is 
that their tendency to attack the US position endangers the viable strategic alliance 
relationship that has survived for more than 50 years. They regard the Bush administration’s 
hard-line policy toward North Korea as typical of US imperialism and obstructionism. For 
them, the Bush administration was the greater obstacle to inter-Korean reconciliation and 
reunification on the Korean peninsula. The NGO leaders are now focusing on Pyongtaek 
issue to organize protest against the transfer of US forces to a new post south of the Han 
River. As we have seen in this study, it can be expected with certainty that they will use a 
variety of methods to influence the members of the National Assembly, and disseminate their 
excessively nationalistic views through the media and the Internet to mobilize young 
supporters to their cause.  
The Korean NGOs are powerful as long as they are fully funded and supported by their 
sympathizers. However, this study also suggests that their extreme leftist nationalism as well 
as uncompromisingly sympathetic stance toward North Korea has irritated many citizens. An 
indication of this is that people began expressing their concerns about the NGOs’ methods to 
influence the policy-making process. To prevent further damage to the US-ROK alliance, 
policymakers of the two countries and all others concerned should understand the changing 
nature of Korean politics and find ways to protect the long-term strategic and economic 
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